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On the 7 December 1985, the local community council, elected in a
low poll in 1981, summonsed Oukasie residents to a fateful
meeting (1). The residents were informed that they would have
to move 24 kilometres north to Lethlabile on the border of
Bophuthatswana. The 55 year-old township of approximately 12 000
people situated 90 kilometres north-west of Johannesburg and two
kilometres from the Brits town centre was to be demolished.
This paper will briefly reconstruct the history of the anti-
removal struggle in Oukasie and in the process illustrate the
potential difficulties of township struggle. Three key arguments
are made. Firstly, it is argued that in order to understand the
different responses of Oukasie residents to the planned removal,
cogniscance must be taken of the fact that like all townships,
Oukasie at the time of the announcement, was composed of
different social classes and groupings with different material
interests and perceptions. Only by taking cogniscance of this
can the issue of why some residents decided to move and others
decided to stay be explained. Secondly, it is argued that the
occupation of key leadership positions by unemployed residents
fueled the development of vanguardist organisation. Finally, it
is argued that this vanguardism, in the context of high and
lengthy unemployment, contributed to the rise of factionalism and
coercive politics.
What happened in Oukasie has occurred in numerous urban contexts
throughout South Africa. Townships which initially were
organised in that they had elected leaders which had legitimacy
and represented the interests of the residents subsequently
lapsed into varying degrees of disarray. The most notorious
example is Crossroads, but there other areas such as Leandra,
Ekangala, Tumahole and Thokoza where after a solid beginning,
organisation virtually collapsed and repressive vanguardism
became a dominant pattern.
A study of the dynamics of the Oukasie struggle, although it has
its own specificity, could contribute towards understanding the
dynamics of urban politics in other urban contexts, especially
where the leadership has been dominated by unemployed workers.
The Setting
The Brits black township, better known as Oukasie, was
established in 1928 (Government Notice 775 of 11 May, 1928).
Prior to the movement of residents to Lethlabile it was a densely
populated area with approximately 12 000 people living in an area
2,2 kilometres by 300 metres. From its inception, state
provision of services was negligible. In the 1930s, about 120
very inadequate corrugated one-roomed shacks were built by the
state. All subsequent housing was built by the residents
themselves. The privately built housing varies significantly:
prior to the removal, about a third of the homes were adequate
brick dwellings, now about twenty percent are. Most homes are
made of corrugated iron and some of the very poor residents have
used packing cases from the now abandoned Alfa Romeo car plant.
Residents are either stand-holders or tenants of stand-holders.
Stand-holders have the right of occupation of the stand but do
not have freehold rights (2).
Services in Oukasie are rudimentary. At present, residents are
dependent on a bucket sewerage system and about 54 communal taps.
The untarred roads are rutted and treacherous, and storm-water
drainage is minimal. There is no electricity or street
lighting.
A survey conducted in 1987 found that 74% of those residents who
were employed, worked in the white residential area of Brits or
the Brits industrial area. Twelve percent worked in Oukasie
itself and 14% worked in another town. Thirty-nine percent of the
men in employment, work in the industrial area. Most of the
women employed, are domestic workers (Becker et al, 1987:23).
The Brits industrial area developed after it was declared a
decentralisation point in the 1960s. Multi-national companies
such as Firestone, Alfa Romeo., Bosch, Ciba-Geigy and others were
attracted to the area by state incentives and the large pool of
cheap labour available. In the early seventies, prior to
unionisation, many of the factories were paying on average R20 a
week (Interview with local resident) (3). In the 1980s wages
increased significantly due to the growth of a strong trade union
movement in the area. The wage increases also contributed to
bringing to a halt the expansion of industry that had taken place
in the 1970s. In the 1980s a number of factories either closed
down or relocated. The most notable closure was that of Alfa
Romeo in 1985 which at its high-point employed 1 500 workers.
Other companies such as B and S (in pursuit of a non^unionised
work-force and cheap labour) moved to Bophuthatswana. These
closures and relocations contributed to the high rate of
unemployment which at present is close to 50% (Becker et al,
1987:23). There are some workers who have been unemployed for
up to seven years and have lost any hope of obtaining formal
employment in the Brits area (Interviews with residents). As
will be argued later, the desperate plight of many Oukasie
residents has played an important role in shaping urban politics
in the area.
Why the Removal?
The plan to remove the township was first mooted in the 1950s :
(Horrell, 1956). However, it was only in 1970, in the heyday of
separate development, that the removal plan was partially put
into motion. Approximately 400 families were removed to
Motahlung, an area 20 kilometres north-east of Brits in
Bophuthatswana. The local Brits newspaper starkly revealed the
motivation behind this removal when it stated:
The Brits location which has been a local eyesore and abuts
one of our smart suburbs will shortly no longer blight our
town. (Brits Pos, 10 April 1970 (my translation)).
The removal plan was then deferred and the first definite
indication of its rekindling appears in the Brits Town Council
Minutes of October 1975 where reference is made to a letter from
the Secretary of the then Department of Bantu Administration and
Development concerning "the removal of Bantus (sic) resident in
Brits Location". The plan gathered considerable momentum with
the election in 1977 of Dr Jan Grobler as National Party Member
of Parliament for the area. He saw the removal of Oukasie as a
key part of his platform and was in constant contact with the
Minister responsible. Eventually, he obtained the support of
the Cabinet and in 1979 the state bought the farm Nooitgedacht
later renamed Lethlabile (Sunrise) for the express purpose of
developing it into a resettlement town for Oukasie residents. At
this stage, Lethlabile, in line with the state's apartheid
policy, was to be incorporated into Bophuthatswana. The plan to
incorporate Lethlabile into Bophuthatswana was later dropped.
The state probably concluded that if Oukasie residents were to
move to Lethlabile "voluntarily" it was imperative that
Lethlabile was not incorporated.
Prior to the declaration of Brits as a decentralisation point,
the town was very small and Oukasie was situated some distance
from the nearest white homes. However, even at this stage the
township was too close for the likings of many of the white
residents and, as mentioned above, as far back as the 1950s it
had been suggested that the township be moved.
The removal of 400 families in 1970 did not satisfy the white
residents and, as the white population of Brits grew, the demand
to move the township intensified. In the 1970s, it reached a
crescendo with the establishment of a new white middle-class
suburb, Elandsrand, next door to Oukasie. It is part of Oukasie
folk-lore that potential Elandsrand residents were told that
Oukasie was to be demolished. Few areas in South Africa capture
the inequalities generated by apartheid as vividly as this one
does. On the one side there is a collection of typical white
middle-class suburban homes, many with swimming pools, a few
dozen metres north is the teeming poverty of Oukasie, many of its
residents too poor to afford the most basic dwelling.
The Elandsrand residents' perception of Oukasie and its future is
probably captured by this snippet of an interview.
why must we live next to them. It's noisy, crime is high, we
want them to be moved. (Extract from BBC Documentary, Back on
the Frontier).
The conservatism of white Brits residents is indicated by the
performance of the Conservative Party in the 1989 election. In a
77,62% poll they obtained a 3032 majority over the National Party
(The Star, September 9, 1990).
The Brits Town Council also made no secret of its racism and its
desire to remove Ouksie. Every year from 1975/76 onwards and up
until 1982/83 the Mayoral Report stated:
The Council has, during the year, continued its efforts to
have the Brits Black Township, which constitutes a hinderance
for the development of white suburbs, removed. (Mayor's Annual
Report, Brits, 1981-1982. My translation).
When it was announced in June 1983 that funds were definitely
going to be allocated for the building of Lethlabile the National
Party MP, Dr Grobler, stated that "he was joyful at the fruit of
years of hard work". (Brits Pos, 4 March 1983. My translation).
The response of the Mr Chris Heunis, the Minister responsible for
township removals, was more sophisticated. He insisted that the
removal was an altruistic act and argued that the area had to be
moved as it was unhygienic and too expensive to upgrade. (Business
Day, 18 October 1986). However, a team of engineers
commissioned by the Brits Action Committee established that for
about four million rand the area could be substantially upgraded
thereby seriously undermining Heunis's claim. (Axelrod et al,
1986).
The residents of Oukasie felt very strongly that racism was the
prime motivation for the removal:
The ... whites, you know, are very reluctant to be next to
black people. ... they feel uncomfortable with blacks next to
them. White people in Brits are now getting more
conservative ... If possible they would like to have all the
blacks living alone in their own republics. (Interview with
a member of the Brits Action Committee).
In December 1985, Lethlabile was ready to be settled and within
eight months about half of the residents had moved to Lethlabile.
The remainder were very firmly committed to staying in Oukasie.
Why some residents decided to move
Residents moved for a variety of reasons and revealed very
clearly that black townships are not homogenous entities with a
uniform consciousness. The existence of different classes with
different levels of affluence within these classes ensured that
the responses of Oukasie residents to the state's removal plans
would vary. Thus, workers in unionised factories earn far more
than domestic workers and were able to bear the cost of moving to
Lethlabile. The responses of different households were shaped by
what they saw as their material interests. Besides the primacy
of class there were other variables that shaped a household's
decision whether to move or stay. These included the age of the
house-holder, the possibilty of obtaining compensation for
demolished homes, and whether the household could afford to build
an adequate home in Lethlabile.
Relocation was certainly to the advantage of the middle class
residents. This grouping was comprised mainly of traders,
teachers, nurses, policemen and administrative staff in
government offices and saw moving to Lethlabile as an opportunity
to build new homes and be linked to adequate bulk services:
electricity, water-borne sewerage, tap on the plot, and adequate
roads and storm-water drainage. The provision of superior
facilities in Lethlabile and the deliberate neglect of Oukasie
was a key component of the state's strategy. As mentioned
services in Oukasie are blatantly inadequate. In contrast there
was a clear intent to provide adequate services in Lethlabile and
by June, 1986 20,2 million rand had been expended on services, at
an average cost of R6 380 per stand. (Hansard, House of Assembly
debates, 23 July 1986:430).
Traders had the possibilty of expanding their turn-over due to
the captive market and greater size of Lethlabile. Lethlabile,
although primarily for residents relocated from Oukasie, could
accommodate a far larger population. By June 1986, six months
after the establishment of Lethlabile, Oukasie had become an
almost totally working class township as nearly every member of
the middle class had moved to Lethlabile.
Some members of the organised working class also decided to move.
Trade union organisation had pushed up wages to levels where it
was possible for some organised workers to afford to build homes
in Lethlabile and have the advantage of access to decent
facilities. This movement was facilitated by the granting of
subsidised home loans by some firms to their workers. The
possibility of having adequate domestic facilities, especially
for wives, (doing domestic chores with access to electricity and
water is a lot easier) was a strong drawcard. Organised workers
who stayed often said that their colleagues were reluctant to
leave but were pressurised by their wives.
Some unemployed workers also decided to move. They were
generally owners of brick homes who, because their homes were
brick, received on average R5 000 in compensation from the state
once they moved. This compensation pay-out was very enticing.
Many of these residents had been struggling for years and so this
cash injection was seen as a possible way out of virtual
destitution. No compensation was offered for corrugated iron
houses. These residents were expected to reconstruct their
dwellings using materials brought from Oukasie.
A number of the older residents were also keen to move as
Lethlabile meant they could enjoy adequate domestic facilities in
their twilight years.
Not all movement to Lethlabile was voluntary. Tenants whose
homes were built on the stands of stand-holders who had decided
to move to Lethlabile were often forced to move. When a stand-
holder decided to leave for Lethlabile he was told that in order
to obtain his compensation all the houses on the plot had to be
demolished. As a result, hundreds of perfectly adequate homes
were demolished. This had the effect of rendering many tenants
homeless, forcing them to accept the Lethlabile option. The
tenants could not move back on to the vacated stands nor were
they allowed to move to anywhere else in the township. An
important part of the state's strategy was to freeze the
allocation of government housing and plots from the time of the
December announcement.
It appears as if the state expected that the strategies outlined
above would ensure the "voluntary" removal of all residents.
However, these strategies, although partially successful, still
left more than half of the residents determined to stay and this
may have pushed the state to adopt more persuasive tactics.
March 198 6 saw the beginnings of a spate of petrol-bomb attacks
on the township's leadership by persons unknown. Residents
alleged that the violence was state-initiated and sponsored.
There was a short lull until May 1986, when tragedy struck.
Joyce Moedemoeng, the wife of a trade union organisor and leading
activist in the township, David Moedemoeng, was killed when a
powerful bomb was thrown into their home.
This murder undermined the resolve of many residents of the
hitherto previously peaceful township to stay in Oukasie and many
decided to move to the relative peace of Lethlabile. Their fear
was accentuated by the presence of vigilante groups that roamed
the township at night.
The state of emergency declared on the 12 June 1986 was another
set-back for the anti-removal struggle. Almost the entire
leadership was detained and the remainder went into hiding.
Organisation lost momentum and in this rudderless situation, some
residents lost hope and decided to leave.
A key part of the state's strategy was to be unwavering in its
commitment to remove Oukasie. Residents were very rarely given
reason to believe that the state might rescind its decision.
This total intransigence in the face of sustained community
representation and other pressures was very demoralising for the
residents. The state's intransigence was illustrated by the
Mahlaela vs De Beer case. In April 1986, the state's decision
to freeze the allocation of sites and state housing was
successfully challenged in the Supreme Court and for a while the
state's plans were thrown into disarray (Mahlaela vs de Beer, 23
April 1986). The implications of this ruling were that a key
component of the state's removal tactics, namely the plan to
freeze all growth and development, was undermined. No longer
could the superintendent of the township arbitrarily refuse to
allocate empty stands or government houses to residents.
However, the nature of the South African state (see Morris 1989)
ensured that it would not back down but would instead develop
another strategy to put the removal back on course. On the 17
October 1986, in terms of section 37 (1) of the Black Communities
Development Act, the township was officially disestablished.
This meant that the order proclaiming Oukasie an area for African
occupation was set aside. Oukasie residents now became squatters
in their own township and, as a result, the state was no longer
obliged to fulfil the court's instruction to allocate houses or
plots.
Although this "disestablishment" added some impetus to the
removal, the effect was not great and it remained an abstract
pressure. Residents continued to proffer rent which was accepted
thus implicitly legalising the status of the payees.
The drastic slowdown of movement to Lethalbile in 1987 prompted
the state to use a new tactic. On 26 April 1988 Oukasie was
declared an emergency camp in terms of section 6 of the
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act. A special Government
Gazette was issued which contained a host of regulations which if
strictly implemented would make life in Oukasie intolerable.
Failure to adhere to these regulations gave the superintendent of
the area the power to cancel the residence permit of the
transgressor. Despite these extra pressures few residents left as
by April 1988, the remaining residents had made a firm decision
to stay. The draconian regulations were an irritation but not
enough to provoke a change of mind.
Why so Many Residents Decided to Stay
The question that arises is why, in the face of so many direct
and indirect pressures, more than half of the residents decided
to stay. Four key reasons for this were articulated: financial
considerations; a fear of moving away from one's perceived
community; a refusal to be pushed around by the state and the
relative proximity of Oukasie to work, shops and potential
employment sources. The pertinence of these respective reasons
is linked to an extent to class location and to whether residents
are employed or unemployed.
Most unemployed workers have not moved because it is clearly not
in their interests to do so, especially if they live in a
corrugated iron house. Relocation could intensify their
desperate situation. Unemployed workers battling it out in the
informal sector generally have a similar perception. A move to
Lethlabile is viewed with great trepidation. A long-standing
resident of Oukasie, who survives by running one of the many
small shebeens, expressed this point very forcefully:
I won't go because I have no money to go to Lethlabile, I can
hardly buy one brick so with what can I build a house because
I have no money for one brick. (Interview with author) .
Residents in the informal sector would probably lose their
regular customers.
Many residents have lived in Oukasie for decades. The 1987
survey referred to earlier, found that 70 % of adults had lived
in the town for longer than 15 years (Becker et al, 1987: 30)
This very long association has created immense familiarity and
attachment. It was found that during this extended residence
substantial support networks had been built up. The survey
indicated that 66% of respondents had close relatives in other
households in Oukasie and that 84% of this group had been in
close contact with these relatives in the week prior to the
survey. (Becker et al, 1987:31) There are also very often close
links with neighbours. In the case of unemployed residents these
linkages become crucial survival mechanisms. The survey
illustrated that 44% of residents had participated in a
redistribution of resources in the previous year. (Becker et al,
1987:32). A move to Lethlabile would seriously undermine these
support networks.
A resident who has lived in Oukasie since January 1949 expressed
the above points very crisply.
I've growed (sic) in this place and I know all the corners of
this place and I know who can help if I'm staying here ...
Besides the importance of affordability and social and family
networks, for unemployed residents the close proximity of Oukasie
to the white group area is another key factor inhibiting them
from moving to Lethlabile. This proximity is crucial for casual
employment and shopping. The unemployed were very aware that a
move to Lethlabile would make obtaining casual work a lot more
difficult. Many unemployed residents are constantly seeking
employment. The most common way to do this is to walk to the
Department of Manpower office daily. Financially, it would not
be possible to do this if they were living in Lethlabile.
Finally, the unemployed are aware that goods in Lethlabile cost
significantly more than they do in Brits.
It is not only the unemployed who do not want to move. Many
employed workers are totally adamant that they will not move.
Their reasons are often more vague but revolve around issues like
familiarity, social networks, relative distance to cheap shops
and work and the issue of principle. It is evident that many
residents have close personal ties and a fairly set mode of
spending their leisure time. The density of the township
has meant that many residents have spent their whole lives in
close proximity to one another and as a result, the social bonds
are often very intimate. Friends will often move around in a
tightly knit circle, will drink in the same shebeens, and be in
very regular contact. It would be almost impossible to
reconstruct this communality in Lethlabile and there is a great
fear of losing it. As a member of the Brits Action Committee
said:
I would say I like staying in Oukasie because I was born in
Oukasie, I grew up in Oukasie, I schooled in Oukasie and I've
come to like the place. You know I've come to identify the
place with myself and the other thing is that Oukasie is
different. Unlike bigger townships there are good
relationships and a very strong social structure which has
not been tarnished too much by capitalism. (Interview with
author).
Another very important issue is the issue of distance. Most
workers take a maximum of ten minutes to reach work, taxis being
the predominant form of transport. A move to Lethalbile would
add about another hour to the working day.
A final reason why many residents do not want to move revolves
around the issue of principle. They refuse to be pushed around
by the state. Resistance is partially a political decision.
This is especially true of the more organised workers.
People are determined that they are not going to move, and
then ... what we are saying everyday is that this is not
negotiable, but Lethlabile is not a place for us to sit or to
reside, so we still repeat, Lethlabile is not negotiable what
ever the government does, it can kill us, but we are not
moving. (Local trade unionist, interview with author).
As has been pointed out the response of workers was not uniform.
Some workers did move. The reasons for the varied responses of
workers are difficult to ascertain. A worker making the decision
as to whether to stay or go would be swayed by his commitment to
Oukasie which in turn would be influenced by the length of his
stay in Oukasie, the social networks formed, his level of
affluence (will he be able to afford to build in Lethlabile) and
his accommodation in Oukasie. Some workers were living in very
crowded circumstances while others who were stand-holders were
reasonably comfortable. The latter would obviously have less
inclination to move. Although the attitude of the male partner
would generally be the decider, it would appear as, mentioned
previously, that often the wife would play a major role in
supporting the husband's desire to stay or alternatively
persuading him to move.
Fighting the Removal
On the 8 December 1985, the day after the Community Council
announced the removal plans, a meeting was called (it is unclear
who initiated the meeting). At the meeting, attended by
approximately 800 residents, a committee was elected to represent
the residents in the fight against the removal. This was the
first time residents had elected an organisation to represent
them on a community issue. All previous organisation in Oukasie
had been directed towards the working class in the form of trade
unionism or co-operatives for dismissed workers.
The committee was called the Brits Action Committee (BAC). It
had twelve members, all men. A highly aticulate and charismatic
personality, Marshall Buys, was elected chairperson. At the time
of his election he had been formally unemployed for about four
years. Previously he had worked at Firestone and had been active
in the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (NAAWU).
The treasurer was formerly a leading shop steward at Alfa Romeo.
The secretary was employed at Firestone, where he was the chief
shop steward. The fourth key person on the executive in the
early part of 1986 also joined the ranks of the formally
unemployed when he was retrenched. He had been very involved
with the Young Christian Workers. These four members were very
close friends and this factor, combined with their skills,
developed to a large extent in the trade union movement, soon
ensured that they would form the key decision-making caucus
within the BAC. The BAC became the dominant organisation in the
township and soon extended its portfolio to all township issues.
The women's, youth and church organisations which all emerged in
the early part of 1986 were expected to liaise with the BAC
before embarking on any significant course of action. The
relationship with the trade union movement was more equal.
Activists in the union movement played a role in the shaping of
BAC strategy and the BAC did liase with the trade unions.
However, the fact that the key unionists were at work the whole
day and often had union meetings or workshops at night and over
the week-end meant that their presence and impact in the township
was necessarily limited. This weakened their ability to
influence the BAC and the general trajectory of politics in
Oukasie.
It is unclear how the trade union experience of the dominant BAC
caucus shaped their style of operating. The Federation of South
African Trade Union (FOSATU) experience possibly made them wary
of organisations not controlled by workers. Also, although
within NAAWU in Brits there were shop floor organisation and
accountable structures, it appears that policy was often
initiated by a small grouping. The use of a caucus-type approach
in trade union activity possibly influenced the working of the
BAC. These points, however, remain tentative and require further
research.
In their first year of office the BAC had large-scale support as
they managed to stage a competant, high profile campaign against
the removal and extracted the maximum out of the limited tactics
and resources at their disposal.
In the first eighteen months of the anti-removal fight that
section of the residents who had decided to stay were very united
and determined. The underlying strategy was to put as much
pressure on the state as possible so as to persuade the Cabinet
to rescind the decision to remove Oukasie.
A primary strategy was to launch an intensive publicity campaign.
The press were kept informed of events in Oukasie and were
regularly invited to meetings and township events like clean-ups.
The diplomatic community was kept informed of developments and
strongly encouraged to intervene. Twice, a demarche on the
Oukasie removal was delivered by the European Economic Community
to the South African foreign office.
The Progressive Federal Party was also drawn in. After visiting
the area Helen Suzman made an impassioned speech in Parliament
imploring the state to rescind its decision.
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The BAC drew capital into the struggle by convening meetings with
employer federations like the Federated Chamber of Industries
(FCI) and the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of
South Africa (SEIFSA) and local management. These groupings were
requested by the unions and by the BAC to make representation to
the state on the Oukasie issue. Formal and informal
representations were made by both the FCI and SEIFSA, however,
local Brits' concerns refused to intervene.
Another strategy was to counter state propaganda by commissioning
expert reports on various aspects. As already mentioned, a team
of engineers found that with relatively modest expenditure it
would be feasible to upgrade Oukasie. Other reports examined the
health and socio-economic situation in Oukasie. The reports
concluded that a forced removal to Lethlabile would seriously
affect the standard of living and health of the poorer, more
vulnerable residents. (Barron et al, 1987 and Becker et al, 1987),
Finally, legal assistance was secured and the lawyers concerned
constantly made representation to the state on behalf of the BAC.
These tactics had the effect of restoring the confidence and
morale of the residents and bringing relocation to Lethlabile
virtually to a halt. Despite their success and obvious talents,
the support of the leadership started declining in 1987 and
towards the end of that year they became involved in a desperate
struggle to maintain power. Ultimately, this struggle was lost
and in August 1988 the BAC was replaced by another committee,
hereafter referred to as the new BAC. The new BAC although it
drew on a wider base, there were residents from the women's
organisation and the churches, was also dominated by unemployed
workers. In the process of this leadership struggle,
mobilisation and organisation stagnated and the township was torn
apart by violent conflict. A township which had had a reputation
for cohesiveness and united action had become a battle-ground.
This violence culminated in tragedy when Marshall Buys was
murdered in March 1989.
The disintegration of cohesion
A key question is why there was this rise of coercive politics
and the disintegration of organisational cohesion. In order to
explain this a number of important inter-locking variables need
to be discussed: the mode of organisation of the BAC, the inflow
of a significant amount of foreign funding into Oukasie, the
repressive role of the state and the emergence of powerful
individual rivals were all significant factors. An underlying
factor was the socio-economic conditions prevailing in Oukasie.
The pervasive unemployment and poverty in Oukasie interacted with
all the above variables. Finally, it will be argued that the
structural nature of the township as compared to the work-place
generally makes organisation in the former context more difficult
to sustain.
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The mode of organisation adopted by the BAC had several
ramifications. It adopted a vanguardist position and portrayed
itself as necessarily the bearer of the township's interests.
As such, it was not required to respond to demands to democratise
the decision-making processes by drawing in other township
organisations, especially the trade unions, the women's
organisation, the youth, and the churches. Instead, decisions
were generally made informally, often by the BAC core group.
There is no doubt that many residents felt excluded and
frustrated by this modus operandi and tried to persuade the
committee to adopt a more formal and democratic approach. The
BAC justified their method by arguing that a more open mode of
operation would lead to informers feeding the BAC's strategies
and tactics back to the security police. This would jeopardise
the continued operation of the BAC as it would increase the
likelihood of committee members being detained. The BAC core
group also believed that nobody else could do a better job than
they. They claimed that the initial mass meeting at which they
had been elected gave them adequate legitimacy.
There was, of course, a kernel of truth in this justification. A
substantial number of township residents did support them. In
their first year of office in 1986, when the threat of removal
was very imminent, they did serve the interests of the community
very effectively. There is also little doubt that there were,
and are, informers in the township and that the committee's mode
of organisation ensured that the exact content of their
discussions often remained confined to a small group of trusted
confidantes. However, the committee suffered from the common
vanguardist illusion - that they were indispensable, and failed
to recognise that there were many other efficient and competant
individuals in the township. Also, there was no legitimate reason
not to operate in a more open fashion as a fundamental
organisational premise was that all strategies were to be legal
and peaceful.
In order to understand the reasons for the vanguardism that
existed in Oukasie we need to go beyond the reasons given by the
BAC. We need to look at the class location of the leadership
core. The fact that the leadership was dominated by unemployed
workers was a crucial variable, especially in the context of a
township characterised by extensive long-term unemployment.
Although there is little comparative research in this regard, the
fact that unemployed workers have so much more time and that
being a leader can be psychologically and financially rewarding,
means that in many townships key positions are frequently filled
by unemployed workers. This was apparent in the case of
Crossroads (see Cole 1987) and in the squatter movements on the
Rand between 1944 and 1952 portrayed by Bonner (1990). Seekings'
(1989) work on Tumahole is pertinent. He concludes that with the
movement of "unemployed activists" and "certain students" into
key positions "political organisation in Tumahole was
reorientated, and patterns of mobilisation changed". The
reorientation took the form of an increasing vanguardism and
increasing factionalism. Although Seekings analyses this shift
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primarily in terms of the rise of the Tumahole Youth Congress
within a context of intensifying state repression, the
increasing dominance of the unemployed appears to have been an
important variable explaining the shift away from "grass-roots
organisation". The change in the composition of the leadership
was accompanied by increasing alienation of the leadership from
the masses, rivalry between leaders and corruption:
it became increasingly difficult for activists to raise bail
money for residents who had been arrested and charged. Many
residents were sceptical of activists acting individually,
and rumours spread. Funds were said to be misused, and some
activists were not bailed out because, it was alleged, of
disagreements between particular leaders. (Seekings, 1989:139)
In previous analyses of township politics it has been argued that
for the working class a major problem in the urban
terrain was the possible usurpation of working class leadership
and demands by the petit bourgeoisie. (Foster, 1987: General
Worker's Union, 1987). There is no doubt that in many townships
the petit bourgeoisie will be dominant and that in these contexts
urban politics will generally have a different trajectory to that
outlined in the Oukasie context. However, in almost all analyses
of urban politics the possible centrality of unemployed workers
in township politics is omitted. Generally, there is a tendency
to view employed and unemployed workers as a single entity and to
assume that they share the same aspirations and respond
similiarly politically. However, the psychological effects of
unemployment are profound and can lead to the the unemployed
often having a different perspective to employed workers and
concomitantly, when it comes to urban politics, adopting
different responses to situations.
Ashton (1986:137 and 138) referring to Warr (1983) outlines six
primary effects of unemployment: 1) A lack of money and
resultant anxiety resulting therefrom; 2) activity levels are
diminished, there are few outlets for the output of energy and
the development of skills; 3) the temporal structure starts
breaking down as unemployed people lose their sense of time. They
become bored and time loses its meaning; 4) boredom is
accentuated by the lack of variety. The earning of income
allows people to engage in a number of activities outside of the
domestic realm; 5) the amount of social contacts is often
reduced. Work often also gives the individual a sense of
purpose; 6) finally work provides an important part of one's
personal identity. People's contribution to and status in
society is often measured by whether they are working or not.
The family also measures one's contribution by virtue of the
contribution to the household income.
The implication is that unemployment often leads to what Jahoda
et al in their famous study of the unemployed in Mariental, a
small town in Austria, called the "breakdown of a social
personality". (Jahoda, et al, 1972:x).
13
Summarising the results of unemployment Warr (Warr, in Ashton,
1983:152). reaches a similar conclusion:
the results are clear in respect of psychochological health.
Experiences of strain, anxiety, depression and hopelessssness
are likely to increase because of unemployment, and the level
of aspiration, sense of autonomy and positive involvement in
the world are all likely to be negatively affected.
An important point is that unemployment generally affects
different groupings differently. Thus married women are best
equipped to handle unemployment as they can use their domestic
role to impose "a temporal structure on their daily activities".
(Ashton, 1986:140). Those that have the "greatest difficulty in
imposing a temporal structure are working class males" (Ibid).
The working class male is beset by boredom. This is especially
so in a rigidly patriachal culture as men cannot pass the time by
becoming involved in domestic chores.
In Oukasie, men generally adopt a few specific modes of dealing
with their situation. A small grouping still spends a
significant amount of time looking for jobs in the formal sector.
Almost every day they will walk to town and the Department of
Manpower. A far greater number of males have lost hope of ever
again finding employment in the formal sector. Many have been
unemployed for five years or longer. They survive either through
the help of family members or through informal sector activities.
This involves selling items or services. These informal
activities are often irregular and large amounts of time are
spent not doing anything that can be defined as productive in the
conventional sense. From mid-morning, groups of men pass their
time chatting in makeshift shebeens and heavy drinking is a very
common phenomenon.
Entering into urban politics gave the unemployed workers
concerned a sense of purpose and was a very effective way of
dealing with the trauma of unemployment. It was a way of
fighting against "the breakdown of the social personality". In
the first year especially, when the pressure on the community was
severe, they spent a great deal of time strategising, showing
diplomats and journalists around, liaising with the support
groups and lawyers representing the community, organising
meetings, etc. These activities helped the unemployed workers
break the terrible tedium of the long days and retain a semblance
of self-worth. Time once more became important, there were a
variety of activities and social contacts, they were accorded
respect by fellow residents, and a considerable amount of energy
was expended on organising and learning new skills. In sum, it
enabled them to regain a raison d'etre.
Another very important aspect was that entering urban politics
gave these unemployed workers access to money. As mentioned,
money was collected from the community and outside agencies for
expenses incurred. It is probable that a proportion was used for
personal consumption on the basis that it was the their right as
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township leaders to draw a stipend, especially if unemployed.
The use of positions of power in urban contexts for accumalation
is not uncommon. Bonner (1990) illustrates how this occured in
the squatter camps on the Rand in the forties and fifties and
Cole (1987) has shown that a similar phenomenon occurred on a
large scale in Crossroads.
This outline represents a context in which, especially for
unemployed workers, the retention or gaining of public office is
highly prized. There is a great deal at stake. I would argue
that for an employed worker, gaining or holding public office is
less prized. The different structural position in which he finds
himself means that he has a regular income, has limited time, is
engaged in different activities and has social contacts outside
the domestic sphere. His personal identity is moulded through
other means. Not gaining or losing power in the urban sphere
will not represent a serious setback. In stark contrast, an
unemployed worker has a considerable amount to gain or to lose
both existentially and financially, especially with the inflow of
foreign funding. This in turn, can have a profound effect on the
way urban politics is conducted.
The Oukasie case illustrates that there may be an intense fear of
losing power which can lead to a reluctance to tolerate dissent
and open discussion on more controversial issues. The real
conflict emerged, however, when the BAC's hold on power started
slipping. As mentioned, for the first eighteen months or so, the
level of conflict in Oukasie was minimal. The leadership was
accepted and did not have to embark on undemocratic or coercive
means to retain power. However, towards the end of 1987 the BAC,
mainly because of its vanguardist approach, was being seriously
challenged but they refused to accept the validity of this
challenge and would not hold new elections. Their refusal to
compromise or back down, combined with the existence of an
oppositional grouping very desirous of power by whatever means,
culminated in the violent clashes outlined earlier.
Ultimately, the vanguardist strategy proved to be extremely
short-sighted as it gave extensive ammunition to the embroyonic
opposition that began to emerge in late 1987. The opposition
accused the old committee of being corrupt, dictatorial and
undemocratic and demanded that new elections be held. The issue
of corruption became a key weapon of the opposition in their
efforts to garner support. At each public meeting they asked the
treasurer to provide the community with a breakdown of
expenditure of the monies that had been collected from residents
and from outside donors. This was never convincingly done. The
extent of corruption is unclear. However, the terribly poor
financial records and rumours about large undisclosed sums made
it easy for the opposition to accuse the BAC of corruption and
maladministration. It certainly resulted in the BAC losing a
significant amount of support.
The struggle around monies was heightened by the. influx of
foreign monies to fund particular projects. Sizeable amounts
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flowed in to fund the community creche and the advice office.
The sizeable inflow of foreign funding meant that persons in
leadership positions potentially had access to large sums of
money and a major source of conflict developed around who was to
have access to this money. The BAC was determined to hang on to
control arguing that only they were capable of ensuring that the
money was used properly. The rival committee which emerged
towards the end of 1987, argued that the old commitee's track
record as regards financial management showed that they were not
capable of administering such large amounts. The conflict over
who should be signatories for the advice office monies resulted
in a six month delay in its opening and contributed to a great
deal of bitterness and resentment. (Discussions with advice
office workers).
As indicated previously another reason for the disintegration of
cohesion was due to the strategies adopted by the state. In sum
they were aimed at making life in Oukasie as untenable as
possible and thereby to foster demoralisation and discontent.
Some of the strategies in this regard are discussed under the
heading "why some residents moved?". An important strategy
used by the local security police was to sow the seeds of
suspicion everywhere, intensifying demoralisation and
accelerating the move towards vangaurdist politics. The problem
of informers and agent provacuteurs in the urban context has to
be examined against the backdrop of poverty and unemployment.
There is little doubt that is easier to place agents in the
township then it is to place them in the work-place. In the
urban context, it is common that some of the key leaders are
unemployed and desperately short of money. At times the state
will ensure this by destroying whatever informal activity the
unemployed worker may be engaged in. These individuals become
prime targets of the repressive apparatuses endeavour to
infiltrate the leadership of township organisation. Oukasie was
no exception in this regard. The two committees were constantly
stating that the opposing committee had spies within its ranks.
It is probable that the police were successful in penetrating at
least one of the respective committees and although it was
difficult to obtain conclusive evidence in this regard there were
some indicators. For example, it was impossible to bring the two
committees together despite constant attempts to resolve the
conflict through mediation. A couple of key individuals on
either side blocked any conciliatory measures. Another
indication was the failure to resolve the violent conflict which
erupted between the two committees towards the end of 1988.
Various peace talks were held, however, whenever it appeared
that a break-through was imminent somebody from one of the two
sides would provoke a rekindling of the hostilities. Eventually
the peace talks broke down completely and the two committees each
with a loyal group of supporters from the ranks of the youth
embarked on violent attacks on one another. These attacks
culminated in the brutal slaying by persons unknown of the
powerful chairperson of the old committee, Marshall Buys. In
the same confrontation, the treasurer of the old committee, Moshe
Mahlaela, was seriously hurt. As yet nobody has been charged.
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The state has sat in the wings and let this all unfold. Little
action has been taken against any members of the warring
factions. This has ensured that those intent on winning the
power struggle through violence have been able to pursue this
path with abandon. Intense personal rivalries have been sorted
out on the battle-field.
As mentioned, another key state strategy has been to be
unrelenting as regards the removal. The ever-present threat and
resultant insecurity has contributed significantly to the
breakdown of social cohesion in the community. No committee
could ever claim to have been victorious.
A Final Note: The Difficulties of Organising in the Township
versus the Work-place
The Oukasie situation in some ways captures the difficulties and
complexities of organising in the township versus the work-place
and, as importantly, maintaining organisation in these respective
spheres. In contrast to the urban scenario, the trade union
movement in Brits has remained strong. It can be argued that
the contemporary South African work-place has certain
characteristics which makes initial organisation and the
maintenance of this organisation easier. The factory is a
bounded space to which the same individuals constantly return.
Individuals work in the same areas and are thus intimately linked
to a group of workers. Fellow workers have a very good sense of
what an individual worker is capable of and whether he/she is
stepping out of line. The constituency to organise is not
spread over vast distances, the same people are there day in day
out, and their interests are reasonably uniform. The class
location of the membership is similar. Everybody earns an income
and this makes it less likely that a worker will desperately
endeavour to hang on to power or join the ranks of the security
police. Furthermore, workers selected for leadership positions
generally have little opportunity to use their position for their
own gain and secondly, because they earn a regular income, will
have less aspiration to do so. Once a factory is organised it
is generally possible for the membership, if they so desire, to
keep control of the leadership and ensure accountability. If
shop stewards do not carry out their portfolio in an adequate
fashion the structures in place make it probable that they will
be voted out of office. Generally, it is relatively easy for
workers who are dissatisfied with their representative/s to
dislodge them. The workers' adversary is a lot more accessible
and easier to confront. The shop stewards can at any point
organise a meeting with management and hopefully sort out
problems through negotiation. Finally, the possibility, if all
else fails, of winning demands by collectively withdrawing labour
power makes the need for organisation more concrete and makes the
winning of demands more possible. These characteristics greatly
facilitate communication and the ability to organise.
In contrast, organising in a township and maintaining
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organisation as well as accountability of the leadership is more
complex. There is a diversity of classes and class interests and
the constituency is far more spread out. Even if there is door-
to-door organisation it is probable that each time an activist
visits a house he may be faced with a different person or the
resident, because of domestic duties, may not have any time to
converse. The space to be organised is far more fluid with
individuals constantly moving within it. In some ways this
fluidity, in its effects, is similar to the shift system. As
Nichols and Beynon (1977: 110) state, shift-work runs
against the development of ... collectivism. ... At any one
time half the labour force is either at work or asleep while
the other half is preparing to go to work or getting used to
being at home.
In the urban terrain, if organisation is established, it is often
difficult to maintain. A prime difficulty is to create workable,
durable structures for this purpose. It was thought that the
setting up of street and area committees would resolve the
problem. However, in almost all areas it would appear that urban
leadership has found it difficult to keep these committees
going. Of course a primary reason for this has been the role of
the state which generally crushes any endeavour to create and
maintain these structures. In the work-place the shop
steward system has been generally accepted by capital and
sections of the state and, as such, is to a great extent
insulated from attack. In contrast the street committee system
has been rejected by the state, is totally unprotected by capital
and is thus far more vulnerable to state repression and attack.
In many situations where street committees have been established
the state has generally actively tried to destroy them by
detaining or severely harassing the leadership thereby weakening
these structures and often precipitating their demise. Oukasie
was no exception in this regard. As soon as there was talk of
setting up street and area committees, repression was stepped up.
The state, especially that section which has the power to alter
policy, is a lot less accessible than management and this further
complicates urban politics. Obtaining a meeting with a section
of the state bureaucracy that has real power to address the issue
at hand is exceptionally difficult. In the case of Oukasie the
leadership, after a great deal of time and effort, ultimately
obtained a meeting with the Director-General of the Department of
Constitutional Development and Planning. He listened to the
impassioned pleas of the residents and at the end stated that he
had no power, but would convey the views of the residents to the
Minister.
At present Oukasie is endeavouring to recover from the bitter
conflict which has raged over the last eighteen months. The
trade union movement and the United Democratic Front leadership
have stepped in, in an attempt to overcome the bitter acrimony.
The new BAC, after an initial flurry of democratic activity,
lapsed into a similar style of politics to that practised by the
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original BAC. if anything the new BAC became more repressive and
authoritarian than the leadership it replaced. The leadership of
the new BAC is also dominated by unemployed workers. In the
South African context urban politics is hazardous terrain. There
are structural features which ensure that this is so.
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Notes
1- I worked closely with the Oukasie leadership and residents
from January 1986 until December 1988 whilst employed as a
field-worker for the Transvaal Rural Action Committee. Many
of my conclusions and observations are drawn from this
period.
2. I have not researched the relationship between the tenants
and the stand-holders. However, it appears that it was not a
major issue. In the three years I did field-work in the area
it was never on the agenda of issues.
3. All the interviews referred to were conducted by the author
in 1987 and 1988.
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